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I. ARGUMENTS

A. Charles has established a breach of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and that his due
process rights were violated by the district court's orders.
1. The plain language of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement fully supports Charles'

understanding that the guilty plea would be set aside once he completed probation
and other terms of sentence.

The State incorrectly asserts that "[n]othing

III

the plain language of the agreement

imposed upon the court an additional obligation to ultimately dismiss the case pursuant to I.C.
19-2604(1) upon Guess' satisfactory completion of probation." (Respondent's Brief, p. 8.) The
State's position is simply not supported by the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement.
Under

I.e.

§ 19-2601(3), a court may "[w]ithhold judgment on such terms and for such

time as it may prescribe and may place the defendant on probation." ld. The terms of the Rule 11
Plea Agreement provide that "[Charles] shall receive a Withheld Judgment and shall be placed
on probation ... for a period of no more than five (5) years." (R. Vol. I, p. 53; Appellant's Brief,
App., A, p. 2.) Thus, the plain meaning of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, coupled with the plain
reading of I.C. § 19-2601 (3), fully support granting Charles the relief that he bargained for. The
terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement do not state that the withheld judgment may be indefinitely
suspended or extended. (ld.) The terms do not state or infer that Michele's alleged fear could be
used as a basis to deny him relief.! (ld.) The terms do not state or infer that Charles would need
to persuade the district court that Michele's alleged fear must be overcome in order to be entitled

I This case illustrates the importance of Rule II Plea Agreements and how prosecutors must clearly
articulate in the plea agreements the terms and conditions so that a defendant fully understands the inducement or
consideration being exchanged for a guilty plea. This case also illustrates why plea agreements must be construed in
favor of a defendant, as set forth below.
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to relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1 )-alleged fear existing at the time of accepting the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. In fact, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement expressly provides that Charles would lose his
right to have his guilty plea set aside if he failed to comply with the Agreement:
Should the defendant in any way breach these agreements and covenants, the
State is released from any obligations hereunder regarding an appropriate
sentencing disposition, the Court may sentence the defendant up to the maximum
authorized by law and the defendant shall not be afforded the opportunity to
withdraw his guilty plea.
CR. Vol. I, p. 54; Appellant's Brief, App., A, p. 3 (emphasis added).) These terms unequivocally
support the right to withdraw his guilty plea in not more than five years if he complied with the
terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. Indeed, while the State has taken inconsistent positions at
the trial level and on appeal, the plain reading of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is consistent with
the State's expectation for the final disposition of this matter:

.. .I believe that I can accurately state that the State's intent at the time of the plea
was that by virtue of the Court withholding judgment, Idaho Code 19-2604 relief
would be available to Dr. Guess (and practically speaking, the State would expect
that the Court would grant the relief) if Dr. Guess was fully compliant with his
probation.
(R. Vol. II, p. 262.) By and through this judicial admission, the State should be barred from now
asserting that Charles is not entitled to relief or that it did not expect him to get relief. Strouse v.
K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1997) ("A judicial admission is a

formal act or statement made by a party or attorney, in the course of judicial proceedings ... ")
Thus, the plain meaning of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, as agreed to by all parties, is that
Charles' guilty plea would be withdrawn upon completion of the terms and conditions of
sentence and probation. (Tr. p. 76-78; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 76-78.) Moreover, it was
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implied by the parties that the relief would be granted to Charles if he complied with the terms
and conditions of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. See 21 Am. Jur 2d Criminal Law § 640 (2012)
(courts "will not construe the language so literally that the purpose of the plea agreement is
frustrated; accordingly, the court considers terms implied by the plea agreement"). Thus, the
State has breached the plain meaning of the actual and implied terms of the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. The appropriate remedy is specific performance setting aside Charles' guilty plea,
dismissing this action and restoring his civil rights, as asserted by Charles. (See Appellant's
Brief, p. 12-28.) See also State v. Horkley, 125 Idaho 860, 865, 876 P.2d 142, 147 (1994) ("A
court, as well as the prosecution and defendant, is bound by the agreement once the plea
agreement is accepted without qualification.").
2. At a minimum, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is ambiguous and must be interpreted
in accordance with Charles' reasonable understanding.

Next, the State incorrectly asserts that "Guess' attempt to equate silence with ambiguity
and to have this Court read into the written agreement a provision that simply is not there is
directly foreclosed by the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho
253,281 P.3d 90 (2012)." (Respondent's Brief, p. 9.)
The State's reliance on Gomez is misplaced. In Gomez, the defendant pled guilty to three
felonies through a conditional plea agreement. Gomez, 281 P.3d at 91-92. The parties did not
include any terms addressing restitution in the plea agreement. ld. In fact, on the same day that
the plea agreement was filed, a guilty plea advisory form was filed. ld. at 92. As noted by this
Court, that guilty plea advisory form specifically addressed restitution:
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In the guilty plea advisory, question 32 asks if the defendant is 'pleading guilty to
a crime for which you may be required to pay the costs and prosecution and
investigation?' and cites I.C. § 37-2732A(K). Gomez answered 'yes.'

Gomez, 281 P.3d at 92 n. 2. At the sentencing hearing, the State advised that they would be
entering a restitution order, which Gomez did not object to. Jd. at 92. The district court entered a
restitution order pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k). Jd. In that order, Gomez was ordered to pay
$129,534.97 in restitution and there was no record that he asked for a hearing or otherwise
disputed the restitution. Jd. This restitution order was separate and apart from the sentence
imposed on Gomez. Jd. at 95. The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "[ a] plain reading of the
written plea agreement shows that restitution is not explicitly mentioned." Jd. at 94. The Idaho
Supreme Court held that the plea agreement was silent as to restitution, that the agreement was
"clear and unambiguous" and there was "no clear or obvious error" under the fundamental error
analysis. Jd. at 95.
Here, restitution is not at issue and Charles has fully paid all restitution. (R. Vol. II, p.
247-48, ';9.) In fact, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement explicitly excluded restitution. (R. Vol. I, p. 53,
';3; Appellant's Brief, App. A, p. 2, ';3.) Significantly, as noted by the Idaho Supreme COUli in

Gomez, restitution is "separate and apart" from a sentence. Jd. at 95. In addition, in Gomez, there
was a guilty plea advisory form filed concurrently with the Rule 11 Plea Agreement advising
Charles that the ultimate dismissal of his case would be predicated on the "compatible with the
public interest" prong of I.C. § 19-2604(1). In fact, there is no evidence in the record advising
Charles that the ultimate disposition of his case (i.e., the withdrawal of his guilty plea and
restoration of his rights) was predicated on an entirely separate analysis and that the district court
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had the discretion to deny him relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1).
Unlike Gomez, Charles pled guilty under a Rule 11 Plea Agreement based upon the
promise that he would receive a withheld judgment and probation for a period not to exceed five
years. (R. Vol. I, p. 52-54; Appellant's Brief, App. A, p. 1-3.) Charles' understanding of that
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, as articulated by him in open court, was accepted and not disputed by
the district court or the Sate. (Tr. 76-78; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 76-78.) In fact, since
Charles' Rule 11 Plea Agreement expressly stated that he "shall not be afforded the opportunity
to withdraw his guilty plea" if he breached any terms of the Agreement, it follows that he has the
right to have his guilty plea withdrawn if he complied with the terms of the Agreement. (R. Vol.
I, p. 54; Appellant's Brief, App. A, p. 3.) Thus, unlike Gomez, the terms of Charles' Rule 11 Plea
Agreement expressly contain the terms "withheld judgment" and "withdraw his plea of guilty."
(R. Vol. I, p. 52-54; Appellant's Brief, App. A, p. 1-3.) At issue here is the interpretation of those
terms. Thus, State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 226 P.3d 535 (2010) is controlling, not Gomez, as
discussed in more detail below and in the Appellant's Brief. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 17-23.)
Simply put, Gomez has no application? In reality, however, Gomez stands for the proposition
that the State and district court did not include the required terms to support their respective
positions in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or the Order Withholding Judgment that was entered
pursuant to that Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (R. Vol. I, p. 52-54, 103-110; Appellant's Brief, App.,
A-B.)

The State's present position really amounts to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement lacking

"finality" and amounting to an "illusory" promise. US. v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d 392, 401-02 (7th Cir.
2 It is also unclear from the record in Gomez whether the plea agreement was entered pursuant to ICR 11,
as was the case with Charles' plea agreement (which is significant).

5

1996) ("Were courts free to re-examine the wisdom of plea bargains with the benefit of
hindsight, the agreements themselves would lack finality and the benefits that encourage the
government and defendants to enter into pleas might prove illusory ... ").
3. Contrary to the State's assertions, the facts of this case are not only analogous to
State v. Peterson, but more compelling than that case.

Next, the State contends that "this is not a case like State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 226
P.3d 535 (2010) ... " (Respondent's Brief, p. 11.) In reality, the facts of this case scream out the
application of the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings articulated in Peterson, 148 Idaho 593.
In Peterson, the defendant and prosecution agreed to be bound by the terms of an oral
Rule 11 plea agreement. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596-97. In that oral plea agreement, counsel for
the defendant recited the terms of the plea agreement, with the terms being agreed to by the
State, and then the defendant's counsel "offered his clarifying statement of the scope of the
agreement, with no objection or response from the State" that the plea deal resolved all charges
against the defendant. Id. at 596-97. Despite these clarifying statements, Peterson was
subsequently charged with felony possession of a controlled substance. Id. at 596. After Peterson
was convicted on the felony charge, he appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the plea
agreement was vague and should be interpreted in accordance with Peterson's "reasonable
understanding." Id. at 596-97. The Idaho Supreme Court held the clarifying statements made by
the defendant's counsel constituted the accepted terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement:
Following Peterson's counsel's clarifying statement, the prosecutor stood silent.
Based upon the facts of this case, where both the prosecution and defense have
assented to entry of the plea agreement contract, and where, immediately
following the court's acceptance of the plea agreement, defense counsel proffers a
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description of the scope of the plea agreement, said description differing from
what the prosecutor understands the agreement to encompass, the prosecutor has
an affirmative duty to dispute the defendant's representation of the scope of the
plea agreement, or to ask for further time to clarify the agreement. Otherwise
silence shall be interpreted as acceptance of the stated terms.

Peterson, 148 Idaho at 597.
Here, it is undisputed that the State and Charles entered into a written Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. (R. Vol. I, p. 52-54; Appellant's Brief, App. A, p. 1-3.) Unlike Peterson wherein the
district court questioned counsel, the district court went a step further and directly questioned the
Charles to ascertain his understanding of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement:
(The Court):

And my understanding is that you're pleading pursuant to a Rule 11
Agreement; is that correct?

(The Defendant): Yes.
(The Court):

Why don't you explain to me what your understanding is of
what will happen to you if I accept that plea.

(The Defendant):

Well, my understanding is there will be a presentencing
investigation and then a sentencing hearing.

(The Court):

And do you understand that the agreement contemplates that
you would receive a withheld judgment as a result of pleading
guilty to this charge?

(The Defendant): Yes, sir.
(The Court):

Do you know what a "withheld judgment" means?

(The Defendant): Yes.
(The Court):

Why don't you explain to me what you're understanding is?

(The Defendant): Well, I mean that I guess, I'd explain that - my understanding
of the entire agreement is that I - that I am pleading guilty to
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this charge and that I will spend - my punishment will include 30
days in Latah County j ail. I will pay a $1,000 fine. And I'm
pleading guilty to one of the - one of the felony charges. I'll
have a year probation, and if I fulfill the period of probation
without any problems in that period of time, that the felony
charges would -- would be dropped.

*
(The Court):

(The Defendant):

*

*

*

*

Well, Mr. Guess, the -- I think you understand what a withheld
judgment means. It means that if you comply with your terms
and conditions of probation that at the conclusion of the period
of probation, which is for a period of no more than five years,
ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT, that you could come
in and petition to have your guilty plea, which you tendered
today, withdrawn and the charge against you dismissed. Do
you understand that?
I do, yes.

(Tr. p. 76-78; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 76-78 (bold, underlined and capitalized emphasis
added).) As confirmed by his undisputed testimony, Charles rightfully believed that, according
to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, his guilty plea would be withdrawn once he complied with the
terms of sentence and probation. Charles' understanding was articulated by him in open court,
without objection by the prosecutor or the district court. Such silence constitutes the acceptance
of Charles' understanding of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement (which, not surprisingly, the State does
not address in its Brief). Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596-97 (citing Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 69 (1981)).3 Contrary to the State's argument, the above testimony does not show

3 As noted on page 20 of Charles' Appellant's Brief, the Idaho Supreme Court cited to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 69 (1981) to support its holding in Peterson:
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that "to the extent Guess believed the plea agreement calling for a withheld judgment meant the
'felony charges would ... be dropped' upon his successful completion of probation, such
misconception was expressly corrected by the district court who advised Guess that he could

petition to have his guilty plea withdrawn and the case dismissed." (Respondent's Brief, p. 12.) It
is disingenuous for the State to assert that Charles allegedly knew that the ultimate dismissal of
his case was subject to an additional discretionary analysis simply because the district court
advised Charles that he could "petition" to have his guilty plea withdrawn after completed
probation. In fact, Charles' understanding, which was not objected to by the State or the district
court, simply confirms what was everyone's understanding at that time-that Charles would
need to comply with his terms of sentence and probation before his guilty plea would be
withdrawn through the procedural step of filing a "petition." (See also Appellant's Brief, p. 40.)
Significantly, this was the precise time that the State should have advised Charles of the position
that they are presently taking, but instead the prosecutor remained silent. Indeed, the "prosecutor
hard] an affirmative duty to dispute [Charles'] representation of the scope of the plea agreement,

[1]t is a general rule of law that silence and inaction, or mere silence or failure to reject an offer
when it is made, does not constitute an acceptance of the offer. Vogt v. Madden, 110 Idaho 6, 9,
713 P.2d 442, 445 (1985). However:
(I) Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate as
an acceptance in the following cases only: (a) Where an offeree takes the benefit
of the offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to
know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation ...
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69 (1981).

Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596. This is precisely why Charles' reasonable understanding of the Rule II Plea
Agreement, as articulated by him in open court without objection from the State or the district court, became terms
of his Rule II Plea Agreement, irrespective of any other arguments or reasons to interpret the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement in accordance with his reasonable understanding based upon the State and district court's silence.

9

or to ask for further time to clarify the agreement," but he failed to do so. Peterson, 148 Idaho at
597. Likewise, the district court failed to advise Charles that his understanding was incorrect.
Thus, the State and district court's "silence shall be interpreted as acceptance of the stated
terms." Id. at 596. For these reasons and those stated in Charles' Appellant's

Brief~

Peterson is

applicable to the interpretation and enforcement of Charles' Rule 11 Plea Agreement. 4
(Appellant's Brief, p. 17-23.)
B. Charles' has established that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief.
1. The district court's refusal to grant Charles relief was based solely on Michele's

alleged fear.
The State incorrectly asserts that Charles did not allege that the district court abused its
discretion and it cites to transcript testimony in an ill-fated attempt to persuade the Court that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that it was not compatible with the public
interest to allow Charles to withdraw his guilty plea. (Respondent's Brief, p. 16-18.)
First, Charles asserted that "the district court incorrectly perceived the issues in Sections

4 In footnote 1 on page 13 of Respondent's Brief, the State mischaracterizes Charles' arguments. Charles is
asserting that he faithfully and diligently complied with all terms and conditions of sentence and probation imposed
upon him through the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. Charles asserts that if a withheld judgment is granted pursuant to the
terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and that Agreement does not provide that the district court retains the
discretion under I.e. § 19-2604(1) to ultimately decide if and when a defendant could withdraw his guilty plea, a
district court does not have any discretion to deny the relief, particularly, as here, where Charles articulated in open
court, without objection, his understanding of the terms of that Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (Tr., p. 76-78; Appellant's
Brief, App., C, p. 76-78.) If the State desired to take its present position, it should have inserted a provision in the
Rule II Plea Agreement stating that the determination of if and when Charles would be entitled to withdraw his
guilty would be decided at a later date and in the discretion of the district court in the manner set forth in I.e. § 192604(1). Thus, once the district court accepted the plea agreement and Charles lived up to his end of the bargain, the
Legislature's intent to reform is met and, barring terms reserving fUliher discretion or any new evidence that
dismissal was not "compatible with the public interest," the Legislature's intent and Charles end of the bargain
should be honored as being "compatible with the public interest."
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(A)-(B) & (C)(1) as ones of discretion" and the district court abused its discretion when it
refused to permit Charles to withdraw his guilty plea and restore his civil rights. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 11 & 33.) Second, despite the district court's reasoning on pages 17-18 of the
Respondent's Brief, the district court clarified that its denial of I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief was
based solely on Michele's alleged fear, which was a clear abuse of discretion:
(Mr. Bond):

... so that I know I understood you right, did vou say earlier that
if Michele didn't object, then you would grant the relief?

(The Court):

I did ... Whether that is possible is anybody's guess.

(Mr. Bond):

So, that's what you're really hinging the -- the compatible with
public interest is, whether if Michele is -- your concern over
Michele?

(The Court):

That's my current reservation.

(Tr., p. 41, L. 15-21, p. 42, L. 1-2; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 41, L. 15-21,24-25, p. 42, L. 12 (emphasis added).) The State is attempting to show that the district court considered other
factors when it ruled that it was not "compatible with the public interest" to grant Charles relief,
but the district court clearly confirmed that the sole reason was Michele's alleged fear and that it
would grant the relief if Michele consented. (ld.) Notwithstanding any requirements to grant
relief under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, the district court's refusal to grant Charles relief
because the victim will not consent is an abuse of discretion and misapplication of I. C. § 192604(1). Moreover, as noted by the transcript quoted on pages 16-17 in Respondent's Brief,
Michele never objected in the first place. Rather, she stated: "[ s]0, it's your decision, Judge."
(Tr., p. 55, L. 20; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 55, L. 20.) Thus, the district court's reliance that
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Michele objected through her statement was also an abuse of discretion because she never really
objected at all. (Tr., p. 55, L. 11-24; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 55, L. 11-24.)

2. There is no requirement under I.e. § 19-2604(1) as to when the district court
must find that it is compatible with the public interest.
Next, the State asserts that the district court must make a finding that it is compatible
with the public interest at the time of the motion to dismiss. (Respondent's Brief, p. 19-20.) The
State again misses the point. Charles concedes that the State is generally correct, but the analysis
is different here because Charles' withheld judgment was a product of a Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. In addition, there is nothing in I.C. § 19-2604(1) that requires the district court to
make the finding that it is "compatible with the public interest" at the time of granting a motion
to dismiss. The plain words of the statute simply require the district court to make that finding.
Charles' Rule 11 Plea Agreement does not contain a single term stating that he would need to
demonstrate to the district court that it was "compatible with the public interest" to set aside his
guilty plea or that his guilty plea would not be set aside under I.C. § 19-2604(1) once he
completed probation. (R. Vol. I, p. 52-54; Appellant's Brief, App. A.) Moreover, there is a
significant difference between a withheld judgment entered pursuant to a Rule 11 Plea
Agreement, as is the case here, and a withheld judgment entered without such an agreement. As
noted in Charles' Appellant's Brief, a plea agreement implicates due process and the protections
provided under the United States and Idaho's constitutions. (Appellant's Brief, p. 23-28.) In
addition, the Idaho Criminal Rules, including I.C.R. 11, take precedent over a statute when there
is a conflict between procedural matters, i.e., when a withheld judgment would be dismissed. See
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State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539,54',700 P.2d 942,944 (1985). If the State and the district
court erroneously failed to consider the "compatible with the public interest" prong of I.C. § 192604(1) at the time of accepting the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, Charles should not be penalized by
that failure. Neither the State nor the district court can argue that they advised Charles prior to
entering the Rule 11 Plea Agreement that the ultimate dismissal was subject to a separate and
distinct finding of "compatible with the public interest" and no such terms or condition were
included in that Agreement. (R. Vol. I, p. 52-54; Appellant's Brief, App., A.) As a result, Charles
asserted that the analysis is different when dismissing a withheld judgment that was the product
of, and induced through, a Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (See Appellant'S Brief, p. 12-17 & 40.)
With respect to the State's asseliion that it is not collaterally estopped from re-litigating
Michele's alleged fear, the State again misses the point. (Respondent's Brief, p. 19.) Charles
simply asserted that the State should not be permitted to re-litigate Michele's alleged fear as a
basis to obtain the maximum five-year period of probation, only to later assert that her same
alleged fear should be the basis to deny Charles the right to withdraw his guilty plea over five
years later. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 34-35.) The State and district court could have rejected the
Rule 11 Plea Agreement based upon Michele's alleged fear, but they both failed to do so.
Next, the State incorrectly asserts that "Guess' claim on appeal that the court erred by
'refus[ing] to restore' his gun rights (Appellant's Brief, pp. 41-45) is not properly before this
court." (Respondent's Brief: p. 20 n. 3.) Charles asserted below and on appeal that he is entitled
to have his civil rights restored, including his right to bear arms for hunting purposes. (R. Vol.,
II, p. 235,238-241,269-72.) The district court denied Charles' motions to have his civil rights
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(including gun rights) restored, and it was not required to issue an OpInIOn specifically
addressing those civil rights. As asserted by Charles on appeal, the restoration of his civil rights
is intertwined with and an integral part of withdrawing his guilty plea, because you cannot have
one without the other. (Appellant's Brief, p. 23-28, 41-44.) In fact, the restoration of his rights is
required under I.C. § 19-2604(1). Thus, the restoration of Charles' civil rights (including his
right to bear arms) is properly before this Court. However, even if the issue was not properly
before the Court, "the court shall pass upon and determine all questions of law involved in the
case presented upon such appeal, and necessary to the final determination of the case." I.C. § 1205; see also In re Estate of Keeven, 110 Idaho 452, 456-57, 716 P .2d 1224 (1986). Moreover,

there was an adverse ruling-Charles' civil rights were not restored (including his right to bear
arms), despite his request. Since the State did not dispute Charles' arguments regarding the
restoration of his civil rights (including his right to bear arms), the State has conceded that issue.
See I.AR. 35(c).

Next, the State incorrectly asserts that Charles is basing his request for relief solely on the
district court finding that he had "complied with probation and better than 'any defendant [the
district court could] remember while on probation.'" (Respondent's Brief, p. 20.) There is no
question that the district court must make a finding that it is "compatible with the public interest"
to grant relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1). Charles asserts, however, that if he complies with the
terms of sentence and probation and there were no other conditions that were required to be met
in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, then it would be an abuse of discretion to not permit him to
withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's Brief, p. 29-30.) Notably, if Charles violated any terms of
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the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, he would have lost his right to have his guilty plea set aside and his
civil rights restored. (R. Vol. I, p. 54, ';6; Appellant's Brief, App., A, p. 3.)
Charles' arguments are all based upon the due process implications associated with the
withheld judgment being entered pursuant to the terms of a Rule 11 Plea Agreement and that the
Rule 11 Plea Agreement does not contain a single terms that permits the State or district court
from taking their present positions. (R. Vol. I, p. 52-54; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 1-3.)

3. Michele's alleged fear is not a basis to deny Charles relief under I.e. § 192604(1) and there was no evidence that she ever objected to him obtaining relief.
The State attempts to create a new legal standard that a victim's alleged "fear" is a basis
to deny relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1). (Respondent's Brief, p. 21-25.) The State's arguments,
however, lack merit factually and based upon the plain language of I.C. § 19-2604(1), which
does not grant any rights to a victim to determine if, or when, relief is granted.
The State incorrectly asserts that Charles' interpretation of "compatible with the public
interest" is "unduly restrictive and ignores the fact that victim's rights are a matter of public
interest under Idaho law." (Respondent's Brief, p. 21.) First, the State's position is far from true.
Charles acknowledges Michele's right to participate in the criminal proceedings, as provided
under Idaho law. However, Charles asserts that under I.C. § 19-2604(1), Michele is not entitled
to determine whether relief is granted and the district court is not authorized to condition
granting relief based upon Michele's consent or acquiescence. See Manners v Bd. of Veterinary

Med., 107 Idaho 950, 952, 694 P.2d 1298 (1985) (Nowhere in that statute is there language ... ").
Granting Charles relief as being "compatible with the public interest" does not necessarily mean
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that it will be compatible with Michele's desires. Instead, granting or denying Charles relief is an
issue for the community as a whole, as asserted by Charles in his Appellant's Brief. (See
Appellant's Brief, p. 30-38.) As for the State's assertion that "there can be no serious question
that the public has an interest in the victim's safety and sense of well-being," this argument
ignores that fact that Michel is not a resident of Idaho. In fact, Michele has resided in Walla
Walla, Washington for over six years. (Presentence Report, p. 5.) Moreover, the State does not
cite any authority for its argument that "compatible with the public interest" may only be
satisfied if the victim has no fear. Lastly, it should be noted that Mr. Welsh, the other victim, has
no objection to granting Charles relief as "he didn't have any position about how

this case went

at any stage. He didn't need to be involved any more" and there is "no issue with Mr. Welsh."
(Tr., p. 33, L. 21-25, p. 34, L. 1-5.)
Next, the State incorrectly asserts that "[a]s recognized by the district court in this case, a
victim's continuing fear of a defendant is one of many considerations that must be balanced in
determining whether to grant the defendant's request for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief." (Respondent's
Brief, p. 22.) However, the State fails to cite any authority for this proposition. In fact, the only
reason provided to deny Charles relief was the district court's consideration for Michele's
alleged fear and nothing more. (Tr., p. 41, L. 15-21, p. 42, L. 1-2; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p.
41, L. 15-21,24-25, p. 42, L. 1-2.) Although the State correctly pointed out that district court
noted that it may still grant Charles relief if Michele did not acquiesce (Respondent's Brief, p.
22), the State's position ignores the fundamentally flawed argument that Michele's alleged fear
was a basis to deny relief in the first place. Moreover, neither the district court nor the State has
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provided any authority for the proposition that a victim's alleged fear is a basis to deny relief
under I.C. § 19-2604(1). Since the only reason for not finding it "compatible with the public
interest" was based upon Michele's alleged fear (which was not based upon any new act or
omission by Charles), the district court abused its discretion by denying I.e. § 19-2604(1) relief.
The State incorrectly asserts that it "is patently meritless" for Charles to assert that the
district court's findings that Michele feared him and objected to granting relief "are not
supported by any evidence." (Respondent's Brief, p. 23.) This is simply not true. In fact,
although Michele attended the hearing on Charles' first motion to dismiss via telephone, she
never actually objected at that hearing. (Tr., p. 49-57.) She simply stated twice that: "[s]o, it's
your decision, Judge." (Tr., p. 55, L. 20; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 55, L. 20.) Significantly,
Michele did not attend in person or by telephone, and, therefore, did not object at the hearing for
the motion to dismiss held on January 26, 2012. (Tr., p. 8-43.) Michele did not provide any
specific reasons at either hearing why she feared Charles nor did she provide any new reasons to
support any new fear. (Tr., p. 8-43, 49-57.) Contrary to the State's assertion, there was no
statement or evidence presented that "she opposed [Charles'] motion for dismissal and any
accompanying restoration of his civil rights." (Respondent's Brief, p. 23.) In fact, Charles and
Michele's only child Griffin, now a 27-year-old dentist, wrote a letter in support of Charles
wherein he stated that: "[i]n my communications with my mother she has had no objection to full
reinstatement of [Charles'] civil liberties." Griffin Guess also noted that the "community knows
and recognizes [Charles] as a great physician" and "[ r]estricting an educated, able, and valuable
member of the community from full liberties will be a loss." (R. Vol. II, p. 181; Presentence
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Report, p. 11.) Lastly, the State asserts that Michele had "unbelievable terror" of Charles and her
desire for a strong sentence. (Respondent's Brief, p. 23 n. 4.) In reality, Michele appeared shortly
after that hearing at various divorce related hearings with Charles, remained alone with Charles
at various times and she personally appeared at Charles' home to hold a three-day auction
between Michele and Charles to divide all of their personal property. (R. Vol. II, p. 256-258,
~~3-6.)

The evidence before the Court is that Michele is not really afraid of Charles and she

never formally objected to him obtaining relief. 5 Thus, contrary to the State's assertion, Charles
has shown "clear error in the district court's factual findings that Michele still feared [Charles]
and objected to his motion for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief." (Respondent's Brief, p. 23-24.) There
was no objective proof of fear and there was no evidence submitted that Michele actually
objected to Charles obtaining I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief.
Next, the State incorrectly asserts that there was objective evidence of fear sufficient to
support a finding that it was not compatible with the public interest to grant Charles I.C. § 192604(1) relief. (Respondent's Brief, p. 24-26.) The State also mischaracterizes a number of
alleged "facts" in support of its arguments. (Jd.)
First, the State asserts that Charles' Psychologist is the former Psychologist for Charles.

5 At the hearing, the district court recognized that this action arose from a bitter divorce. Not to downplay
the significance of Charles' acts for which he will forever be ashamed (R. Vol. II, p. 248, ~10) and with all due
respect to Michele as the victim, Charles and Michele's 30-year marriage ended when Michele had "extramarital
affairs" and lied to Charles "about the state of their finances." After the charges were filed, Charles "stated that he is
not bitter or angry about his wife's adultery, he is just hurt. He stated, 'She ended up being a stranger.'"
(Presentence Report, p. 11.) Notwithstanding the hurt Charles endured, he aggressively sought and received
counseling. In support of his Motion to Dismiss, Charles' Psychologist opined that "[Charles] has no desire to have
any additional contact with [Michele], except in the context of co-parenting their [twenty-seven-year-old] son. [He]
do[ es] not believe that [Charles] currently poses a threat to [Michele], or to himself at this time." CR. Vol. II, p. 183.)
Thus, there is ample evidence to support that it is compatible with the public interest to grant him relief.
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Charles' Psychologist, Dr. Rehnberg, is not, as the State contends, his former Psychologist. Dr.
Rehnberg clearly articulated his and Charles' long-term relationship that started in 2006 in the
letter that he submitted to the district court. (R. Vol. II, p. 182.) Although Charles stopped
seeking counseling on an "on-gong basis" in was the summer of 2011, Dr. Rehnber and Charles
remained in contact via the telephone and email. (Id.) Thus, to the extent that the State is
implying that Dr. Rehnberg was not in a position to adequately address Charles, the State is
simply incorrect.
Second, the State incorrectly asserts that "there was plenty of evidence before the court to
support the conclusion that Michele's continued fear of Guess was objectively reasonable in this
case.,,6 (Respondent's Brief, p. 24.) The State is simply ignoring the facts and evidence. There is
no question that Michele had objective reason to be fearful of Charles at the time of sentencing.
However, to the extent that Michele's alleged fear may be a basis to deny relief, it should be
based upon new evidence or events that occurred after sentencing. The record is void of any
evidence to suppOli any new or renewed objective fear. Indeed, at the hearing on Charles'
Motion to Dismiss, Michele stated: "I would like to tell you that I still have some fear." (Tr., p.
55, L. 17-18; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 55, L. 17-18 (emphasis added).) Thus, by Michele's
own admission, her alleged fear is objectively less than the fear she had at the time of sentencing.

It should be noted that the district court ordered the maximum five-year period of probation and
entered a No Contact Order to alleviate Michele's fear. That No Contact Order was never

6 In the first paragraph of page 25 of Respondent's Brief, the State incorrectly asserted that Michele and
Mr. Welsh "were ultimately able to escape." To the contrary, Charles allowed Michele and Mr. Welsh to leave.
(Presentence Report, p. 3.)
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renewed or extended by Michele as provided under I. C. R. 46. 2(b). The other victim, Mr. Welsh,
expressed no desire to remain involved in the proceedings, thereby confirming that he had no
fear of Charles. (Tr., p. 33, L. 15-25, p. 34, L. 1-5.) The State's arguments completely disregard
the fourteen letters and Affidavit by counsel submitted in support of Charles. (R. Vol. II, p. 179209, 255-258.) In fact, Charles Psychologists' opined that he does not "believe that [Charles]
currently poses a threat to [Michele], or to himself at this time." (R. Vol. II, p. 183.) Thus,
although Charles asserts that a victim's fear is not a basis to deny relief under I. C. § 19-2604(1),
the district court abused its discretion when it found that the fact that Michele allegedly still had
"some" fear supported a finding to deny Charles relief.
4. The State has failed to rebut the evidence submitted on behalf of Charles and,
therefore, setting aside Charles' guilty plea and restoring his civil rights is
warranted and consistent with the standard set forth in State v. Dieter.
Charles responds in this section to the State's contentions that it is not "compatible with
the public interest" to grant him relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1). After the State submitted its
Respondent's Brief, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its decision in State v. Dieter, 2012 WL
4054112 (Idaho 2012). In Dieter, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "public interest refers to
that which the public or the community at large has an interest." Id. *5. This is consistent with
the definition articulated by Charles. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 30-33.) However, the district
court's decision denying Charles relief was based erroneously and solely on Michele's alleged
fear, which is not a "public interest" as defined by the Idaho Supreme Court in Dieter. (Tr., p. 41,
L. 15-21, p. 42, L. 1-2; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 41, L. 15-21,24-25, p. 42, L. 1-2.)

Dieter is also easily distinguishable from the case at bar for several other reasons. First,
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the district court found that "Dieter did not fully comply with the probation terms and therefore
decided not to dismiss the case.,,7 Dieter, *4. Here, Charles completed his probation and the
district court found that "[Charles] ... performed as well as any defendant [the district court] can
remember while on probation." CTr., p. 56, L. 20-21; Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21.)
Second, the district court also focused on Dieter's prior psychological report that stated
"Dieter had been 'frankly dishonest about his sexually deviant interests' and displayed a
'complete lack of motivation towards treatment.. ." Id. Here, the record is void of any dishonesty
or failure by Charles to show motivation for treatment and the district court made no such
findings. CTr., p. 8-43-49-57; R. Vol. II, p. 212-213, 280-286.)
Third, the Idaho Supreme Court also held that the burden was on the defendant to provide
evidence to support a dismissal and that "Dieter provided the court with no new evidence, such
as an updated psychological report or any other proof. .. " Dieter, *6. Here, Charles has met his
burden. He submitted evidence in the form fourteen letters of recommendation on his behalf,
including letters from his Psychologist, who he had diligently seen since the charges were filed,
and his 27-year-old son. 8 CR. Vol. II, p. 179-209.) Dr. Rehnberg, who was also Charles'

7 The Idaho Supreme Court focused on Judge Newhouse's use of the word "substantially" in terms of the
level of Dieter's compliance with the terms of probation. Dieter, * 4.
8 In full disclosure, the undersigned attorney also wrote a letter of recommendation on behalf of Charles.
CR. Vol. II, p. 192-93.) The undersigned attorney has known Charles since the undersigned was a child. The
undersigned's father was a family physician in Lewiston, Idaho for many years and Charles was the radiologist who
would travel from Moscow, Idaho to read x-rays in Lewiston. After meeting Charles as a child at the undersigned's
father's office, the undersigned became good friends with Charles and Michele. During the divorce proceedings,
Charles was represented by the undersigned's former partner Ned A. Cannon in Lewiston, Idaho. On the date of the
altercation, however, the undersigned had not appeared as Charles' divorce attorney. After the events occurred that
led up to the filing of this action, the undersigned attorney appeared and became involved in the divorce proceedings
in any attempt to assist to amicably resolve the remaining issues. CR. Vol. II, p. 255-258.) With all due respect to
Michele, at no time during the various days Michele and Charles were together did Michele show any fear towards
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Psychologist at the time of sentencing,9 submitted an additional letter in support of Charles'
Motion to Dismiss and did so without seeking any compensation from Charles, i.e., he was not a
paid witness:
I have found Dr. Guess to be a very easy man to work with. He has complied with
all [of] the request[ s] of the court, and has completed his formal probation without
incident. At no time in our counseling sessions has he ever expressed wanted to
harm his ex-wife in any way. Overall, he has left me with the impression that he
has no desire to have any additional contact with her, except in the context of coparenting their son. IO I do not believe that he currently poses a threat to her,
or to himself at this time.
(R. Vol. II, p. 183, 252,
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(emphasis added).) Dr. Rehnberg also invited the district court to

contact him if the district court needed additional information. (Id.) However, the district court
never asked Dr. Rehnberg for more information and the State never disputed his opinions nor did
it offer any opinions from another Psychologist to dispute any of Dr. Rehnberg's opinions.
Charles and Michele's 27-year-old son Griffin stated in his letter submitted to the district court:
I again relate that I have not witnessed nor been subject to any maltreatment by
my father. II ... In my communications with my mother [Michele] she has had no
objection to full reinstatement of [Charles'] civil liberties. I wish to improve my
relationship with my parents and believe that finality, as full restoration of my
father's civil liberties, is the only measure that will encourage resolve.

Charles. (/d.) In fact, Michele and Charles were left alone together without incident and she insisted on holding an
auction, at the same family home where the incident occurred, between her and Charles that required each of them to
bid against the other to determine who would be awarded the community's personal property in their divorce. The
fact that Mr. Welsh also attended seems to support the finding that both he and Michele were not afraid, that they
both knew the altercation was an anomaly and that they were not worried about it occurring again.
9 In his July 20, 2006 letter submitted for Charles' sentencing, Dr. Rehnberg opined that "I do not believe
that Dr. Guess intended to kill his wife or her attorney ... believe[d] that [Dr. Guess] has many admirable attributes
and also believe[d] that he has the potential and desire to provide many more years of valuable service to the
medical community, if given the chance." (R. Vol. II, p. 186.)
10 Charles and Michele's only child is their son Griffin, who is now 27-years-old. (Presentence Report, p. p.
II.) Griffin also submitted a letter in support of his father Charles. (R. Vol. II, p. 181.)
II Michele alleged that Charles has mistreated her over the years. Griffin disputed that contention. Griffin's
contention is consistent with Charles' testimony. (R. Vol. II, p. 244, ,-r3.)
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(R. Vol. II, p. 181.) Although Michele was provided with a copy of Griffin's letter, she did not
dispute it. In fact, her telephonic statement was consistent with Griffin's letter because she never
objected to granting Charles relief or restoring his civil rights. (Tr. 8-43, 49-57.) According to
Griffin, the public interest will only be served if this matter is laid to rest once and for all. This
provides yet another independent reason to grant Charles relief. In addition, the undersigned
attorney also submitted an Affidavit based upon his interaction with Michele and Charles, and
therein testified that Michele did not appear to fear Charles. (R. Vol. II, p. 255-258.) Although
Michele was provided with a copy of that Affidavit, neither she nor the State disputed any of the
undersigned's testimony. Other letters were submitted by individuals to support that it was
compatible with the public interest. Charles "has had a great influence not only on my life, but
the lives of my entire family." (R. Vol. II, p. 190.) "The one reason that I know Charles would
like to have his rights back is to be able to continue his passion for hunting with friend and
family." (Id. at p. 195.) "[Dr. Guess] was never late, never complained, never unaccounted for,
and in my view represented no risk to our faculty, staff or students during his time here ... Dr.
Guess is remorseful, humiliated, and embarrassed by his egregious acts and simply wants to
restore his life and rights as a citizen." (Id. at p. 197.) "Charlie is a good person and he has a big
heart and would do anything to help someone if they needed it. I know I can always count on
Charlie if I need anything." (Id. at p. 199.) "During his five year probation period, I personally
attest he has never violated what has been expected of him. He has carried out the full letter of
the law .. .I firmly believe that Mr. Charles Guess is an asset to his friends and community and
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always will be in the future." (Jd. at p. 200.) "My observation is that he has made a very good
recovery and I was impressed with his avoidance of alcohol during that time ... [I have] benefitted
from his generosity ... " (Jd. at p. 203.) In other words, the only evidence before the district court
supported granting Charles relief as being "compatible with the public interest" and no evidence
was submitted opposing granting him relief. In fact, the State did not oppose granting Charles'

I.e. § 19-2604(1) relief in the first place.
Fourth, in Dieter, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision because
it ruled within its discretion "based upon the facts and evidence available." Dieter, *6. Here, the
only alleged evidence was Michele's alleged fear at the first hearing (Michele never attended in
person or via telephone the second hearing), which was not really any evidence at all since she
never formally objected to granting Charles relief or restoring his civil rights. (Tr., p. 55, L. 6-24;
Appellant's Brief, App., C, p. 55, L. 6-24.) Since Michele never objected to dismissing the case
and restoring Charles' civil rights, the district court abused its discretion because its decision was
not based upon any evidence at all and did not consider the overwhelming evidence submitted
that supported granting Charles relief. Moreover, the district court abused its discretion because
there was not a shred of evidence to support a finding that it was not "compatible with the public
interest," even if the timing of, or ultimate dismissal, was never a part of, or an inducement to,
his Rule 11 Plea Agreement.
Fifth, the defendant did not assert or contend that his constitutional rights were violated
or that the ultimate dismissal of the withheld judgment was a term or inducement of a Rule 11
plea agreement. Dieter,

* 1-5.

Here, Charles has asserted valid arguments that his constitutional
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due process rights were violated and that setting aside his guilty plea was a specific term and
inducement of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 12-27,41-45.) The State
has not disputed the terms or inducement that led to Charles pleading guilty. The district court
never addressed the inducement or Charles' constitutional arguments.
In sum, the only holding in Dieter that has any relevance to this case is the definition of
"public interest" as being "that which the public or the community at large has an interest."
Dieter, *6. Charles has met this standard and he submitted substantial undisputed evidence to

support the finding that it is "compatible with the public interest" under I.C. § 19-2604(1) to
grant him relief and restore his civil rights. The State did not submit any evidence to support, let
alone infer, that it would not be "compatible with the public interest" to grant Charles relief.
Accordingly, the Court should reverse the district court and instruct it to enter an order
withdrawing Charles' guilty plea and restoring his civil rights as provided in I.C. § 19-2604(1).
C. Charles has established that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by denying
his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief.

The State asserts, albeit inconsistently, that the district court had the discretion and
jurisdiction to deny Charles relief. (Respondent's Brief, p. 27-29.)
First, the State concedes that a "court may not, however, withhold judgment
indefinitely ... Ifit does so, 'it has, for all practical purposes, lost jurisdiction to proceed further.'"
(Respondent's Brief, p. 27 (citations omitted).) The State asserts that "[b]ecause the withheld
judgment expired on August 31, 2011, the court had no jurisdiction beyond that date to enfore
the withheld judgment - i.e., it had no jurisdiction to keep Guess on probation ... " (Id. at n. 6.)
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The State also concedes "that the court's December 23, 2011 order that purported to finally
discharge Guess from probation (R. Vol. II, p. 213), when his probation period had already
expired as a matter of law, is void." Charles agrees. Pursuant to the terms of the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement and as authorized under I.e. § 19-2601(3), the district court entered the Order
Withholding Judgment. (R. Vol., I, p. 103-110; Appellant's Brief, App., B.) The district court
was, therefore, constrained to withhold the judgment for no longer than five years, as provided in
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (R. Vol. I, p. 52; Appellant's Brief, App., A, p. 2.) Unless Charles
breached the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or violated the terms of the Order
Withholding Judgment, the district court, by the terms of its own order, had no jurisdiction to do
anything but dismiss this action and restore Charles' civil rights once he complied with the terms
and conditions of sentence and probation. If the State or the district court desired to retain
jurisdiction for a longer period of time or for other reasons, it was incumbent upon them to
include such language in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Order Withholding Judgment to grant
the district court authority to retain jurisdiction. Absent any language retaining jurisdiction, the
district court and State, like Charles, are bound solely to the terms of that Order, which was
entered and limited by the terms of a Rule 11 Plea Agreement. I.C. § 2601(3). (R. Vol. I, p. 5254, 103-110; Appellant's Brief, App., A-B.)
The State's position that the district court's order is void is entirely inconsistent with its
position that the district court retains discretion. The State's position makes no sense. Either the
district court has jurisdiction or it does not have jurisdiction, as asserted above. In reality, the
State and district court should have included terms in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and the Order
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Withholding Judgment stating that the judgment would be withheld, regardless of Charles'
compliance with sentencing and probation, until such time as the district court found that it was
"compatible with the public interest" under I.C. § 19-2604(1) to allow Charles to withdraw his
guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore his civil rights. Since the Order Withholding Judgment
was entered pursuant to the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and there were no terms in that
Agreement authorizing the district court to retain jurisdiction so long as Charles complied with
the terms of sentence and probation, the district court had no jurisdiction to not dismiss this
action and restore Charles ' civil rights . See State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 792, 919 P.2d 319,
321 (1996); Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 483, 253 P.2d 794,800 (1953).
II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, the Court should reverse the district court ' s two orders
and remand this case with instructions to set aside Charles' guilty plea, restore all of his civil
rights and dismiss this action. Since this action involves post-sentence and quasi-civil matters,
Charles requests an award of costs pursuant to LA.R. 40.
DATED this 20 th day November, 2012.
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